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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD R. HOYT AND 
MAUDE S. HOYT, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
WASATCH HOMES, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 7919 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs agree with defendant's statement of facts 
e:x,cept in the following particulars: 
I. Although plaintiffs did agree to uobtain annex to 
city," it should be borne in mind that the undisputed evi-
dence shows that plaintiffs did obtain such annexation 
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(R. 21) , and that the buyers were required to obtain the 
bond for the improvements, but failed to do so. (R. 22, 
30, 36, 38, and and 41) and that they never advised plain-
tiffs that they were able to furnish a bond (R. 58). 
2. Plaintiffs and the purchasers did not decide, ap-
proximately two months after the earnest money receipt 
and agreement was signed, to draw up a contract as alleged 
in defendant's brief, and no such agreement was ever 
drawn. They did discuss with Mark Eggertsen some pro-
posals looking to the final consummation of the agreement, 
but they came to no meeting of the minds and the dis-
cussion was merely preliminary, according to the testi-
mony of Richard R. Hoyt (R. 19), and the memorandum, 
Exhibit cc 1 ," according to the testimony of Mark B. Eg-
gertsen, was merely a ,copy of a memorandum of some 
notes made by Eggertsen while the matter was being dis-
cussed, and was merely preliminary, and ccthere were too 
many indefinite points that we couldn't reduce it to 
contract at that time" (R. 34, 35,36 and 38). 
3. Beatta C. Johnson, one of the signers as ((pur-
chaser" of the earnest money receipt and agreement, 
Exhibit ccA," at all times of the transactions mentioned, 
namely between April, 1950 and June 1952, was employed 
by the defendant company as a real estate broker. (R. 51 
and 52). 
4. Exhibit ccz" was prepared and served upon the 
buyers long after it became apparent that the parties could 
not agree upon the terms or amounts of the payments re-
quired to be made, and called for payment of the full 
balance of $25,000.00, and not merely the $6,000.00 as 
set forth in defendant's statement o£ facts. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
I. The earnest money receipt and agreement (Ex-
hibit HA") is too indefinite and uncertain to constitute 
an enforceable agreement, and, therefore, defendant is 
not entitled to any commission for the sale of plaintiff's 
property. 
2. Exhibit ul" was not subscribed by either of the 
parties to the said proposed sale and is, therefore, void 
under the statute of frauds. 
3. The defendant failed to produce purchasers who 
were ready, willing and able at any time to purchase the 
said property under any terms or conditions agreeable to 
the plaintiffs. 
4. The plaintiffs at no time accepted the said pur-
chasers, and there was never any meeting of minds between 
the said purchasers and the plaintiffs as to the terms or 
conditions of the payment of the purchases price of the 
said property. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The earnest money receip.t and agreement (Exhibit 
rrA") is too indefinite and uncertain to constitute an en-
forceable agreement, and, there/ore, defendant is not 
entitled to any commission for the sale of plaintiffs' 
property. 
The earnest money receipt and agreement (Exhibit 
uA") was prepared· on the printed form commonly used 
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4 
by real estate brokers to acknowledge receipt of a down 
payment on the proposed purchase of real estate. The 
printed matter on the form obviously is designed, in part 
at least, to protect the real estate agent in his commission. 
Hence the provision for payment of said commission in the 
printed portion of the form. Despite that fact, however, it 
cannot be successfully contended that the agent has earned 
a commission unless he has consummated a sale. The said 
Exhibit uA" does recite the payment of the $1,000.00 as 
earnest money, and the total purchase price of $26,000.00, 
and the $6,000.00 within sixty days, but fails to reveal 
any information whatever as to how or when the balance 
of $19,000.00 shall be paid. The only recital concerning 
the said payment is as follows: ccThe balance of the pur-
chase price shall be paid as follows: $6,000.00 when seller 
approves the sale, $ on delivery of deed or final 
contract of sale which shall be on or before 60 days from 
date 19- earnest money receipt made in lieu of formal 
contract of purchase incorporating necessary provisions 
for the understanding and protection of both buyer and 
seller, and terms & conditions contained herein subject 
to adjustment agreeable to both parties."; also: ((contract 
of sale or instrument of conveyance to be made on the 
approved form of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board in the 
name of Elmer J. Johnson and Beatta C. Johnson, husband 
and wife." 
We respectfully submit that upon the basis of such 
unsatisfactory and indefinite provisions there did not exist 
any meeting of the minds of the parties as to when or how 
or in what amounts the said $19,000.00. would be paid. 
Such details were without question left for subsequent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
determination, and without such determination there is 
no contract. If either the buyers or the sellers attempted 
to enforce this agreement they would be powerless to de-
termine what their respective rights or obligations were, 
and consequently there would be nothing left to enforce. 
In Massie v. Chatom (1912) 163 Cal. 772, 127 P 56, 
a broker was held not to be entitled to a commission for 
a sale of land by the production of prospective purchasers 
who entered into and later repudiated a written mem-
orandum or agreement embodying the terms arrived at 
by the parties, where it was not specifically enforceable 
on behalf of the owner because it was undisputed by all 
that it was not intended to be a contract of sale but a 
mere memorandum of price to be used in future nego-
tiations, with the result that, if the agreement upon its 
face appeared to be more than such a memorandum it 
was the result of a mutual mistake of the parties, neither 
of whom could have successfully invoked the aid of a 
court of equity for specific performance, each, rather 
being entitled to reformation. 
An agreement between prospective purchasers of real 
estate and the owner, although embodying substantially 
the essential terms of sale and the previous negotiations, 
cannot be construed to be a binding and enfor.ceable con-
tract if it bears upon its face language, and is made under 
circumstances, justifying only the conclusion that it is 
tentative and temporary and not intended to serve as the 
final contract of sale, and, upon the withdrawal of the 
proposed purchasers from the transaction, the broker who 
produced them cannot be considered to have earned his 
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commission by obtaining purchasers. Folinsbee v. Sawyer 
(1898) 157 NY 196, 51 NE 994. 
Although the essential terms of a sale of land are 
agreed upon between the owner and his broker's customer, 
where references to the details of the manner of making 
payments of the consideration and other circumstances 
attendant upon the negotiations evince an intention of the 
parties that the agreement is informal and that a further 
agreement is to be entered into, the fact that the informal 
agreement is so far insufficient because of the omissions 
mentioned as to be incapable of specific enforcement may 
be regarded as decisive against recovery of the broker's 
claim for a .commission against the owner, in the event 
the customer refuses to proceed with the transaction under 
a contract listing the property ttfor sale." Measell v. 
Baruch ( 1929) 152 Va. 460, 147 SE 203. 
A contract or agreement which is incomplete because 
it fails to establish mutuality of obligation essential to spe-
cific performance, or to impose a binding duty upon the 
purchaser, by reason of which that remedy would be in-
effectual, does not furnish a basis for the ~claim that a 
broker has earned a commission by producing an eligible 
purchaser or induced a sale. 
In Kampf v. Dreyer ( 1907) 119 App. Div. 134, 1'03 
NYS 962, a broker employed uto secure a purchaser," who 
brought to the owner of land a person who qbtained from 
him a written agreement to sell it, but who made no agree-
ment to buy it, and afterwards· refused· to sign an agree-
ment or take a deed, was held not to be entitled to a 
commission. 
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And in Yeager v. Kelsey (1891) 46 Minn. 402, 49 
NW 199, overruled on another point in Western Land 
Asso. v. Banks (1900) 80 Minn. 317,83 NW 192, a broker 
was held not to have earned a commission for selling land 
for a specified price, to be measured by a stated percentage, 
simply by taking a deposit from a prospective purchaser, 
without further procuring any instrument obligating him 
to purchase, who, after examining the title, refused to 
accept a deed of ,conveyance from the owner. 
In McKelvy v. Milford (1948, La. App.) 37 So. 2nd 
370, a broker was held not to be entitled to a commission 
·where property was listed ccfor sale" at an asking price of 
$8,500 in cash, purchasers who had only $1,500 to apply 
on the price attempted, at the broker's suggestion, to pro-
cure an FHA loan secured by a mortgage on the property, 
and signed what was referred to as an agreement to pur-
chase but actually amounted only to a memorandum 
expressing a consideration of $8,500, ccterms FHA loan 
balance cash," and delivered a $500 check described as 
earnest money to be applied on the sale price should it be 
consummated, and the owner signed the memorandum and 
indorsed and delivered to the broker the check, but the 
FHA would only grant $5,200.00, whereupon the pur-
chasers being unable to acquire additional cash, notified 
all concerned that no further efforts would be made to 
acquire the property. The Court considered that the 
broker was not entitled to recover a commission under a 
provision in the memorandum that it was ccagreed by the 
parties to this contract that the commission of (he 
(broker) is earned upon the signing of this contract by 
both parties to it, and may be deducted from the money 
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herein receipted for," especially where the contract was 
later cancelled by mutual agreement between the owner 
and proposed purchaser because of the latter's financial 
inability to purchase, and itself conferred no tangible con-
tractual rights and was not specifically enforceable and 
could not be construed as conferring upon the broker any 
right to a commission, ccsimply from the signing" thereof, 
because the provision, under such circumstances, would 
lead to ccabsurd consequences" and was ccunconscionable." 
In Mason v. Small (1908) 130 Mo. App. 249, 109 
SW 822, the right of a broker to a commission was held 
not to be established where his obligation required him to 
find a customer who would ex.change real estate for per-
sonal property, and he procured such a customer, who 
entered into a contract which was not enforceable under 
the statute of frauds because of complete failure to give 
adequate description of the land which he owned, and the 
landowner refused to complete the contract, an enforce-
able agreement being considered contemplated in order to 
prote.ct the principal. 
In Kraus v. Campe ( 1946) 328 Ill. App. 37, 65 NE 
2d 127, the court held that a prospective purchaser who 
failed to complete a purchase of real estate was entitled 
to recover a deposit on the purchase price made with a 
broker, where it appeared that the owner and prospective 
purchaser, through the original efforts of the broker, had 
agreed upon the terms and entered into a contract un-
enforceable because of uncertainty in the description, 
which was of such a character and so seriously defe.ctive as 
not to permit the introduction of oral or extrinsic evidence 
to supplement it, although the failure to complete the 
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transaction was attributable to the prospective purchaser's 
delay, the theory being that a real-estate broker has not 
earned a commission by the negotiation of an unenforce-
able contract of sale. 
In Frischkorn Real Estate Co. v. Hinckley ( 1924) 
227 Mich. 399, 198 NW 882, a real estate broker was held 
not to be entitled to a commission, although he delivered 
$200.00 as a deposit and first payment on the purchase 
price of the owner's property and obtained a receipt stat-
ing that the price was $23,000.00, $8,000.00, including 
the deposit, to constitute a down payment uwhen deal is 
closed" the balance to be payable in installments, whereby 
the owner agreed to deliver a land contract for the prop-
erty and close the deal within ten days from receipt of 
abstract and not less than thirty days from the date of 
the receipt, and to pay the broker a commission ccWhen 
deal is closed." When the down payment became due 
the purchaser, on whose behalf the broker had paid the 
$200.00, informed the owner that she was unable to make 
the payment of a further sum, but the prospective pur-
chaser never consummated the transa,ction. The court's 
theory was that the broker had not produced a purchaser 
ready, able, and willing to make the required down pay-
ment and meet the other terms of the contract or prelim-
inary agreement and that the owner did not become liable 
for the commission unless the deal was closed uor unless 
he refused to close it with a purchaser produced by the 
plaintiff ready to comply with the terms of the sale." 
In the absence of an express provision otherwise in a 
brokerage agreement upon evidence that the principal's 
purpose is the construction of an industrial plant and the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
completion of a binding contract containing specified con-
ditions and assurances with respect, inter alia, to certain 
financial arrangements required by the principal for its 
protection, no liability for a commission arises unless and 
until a contract satisfactory to the principal is actually 
executed or unless the broker is instrumental in producing 
a responsible person who is ready, able, and willing at all 
times to enter into a contract conforming to the terms 
outlined in the employment of the broker, payment of the 
commission, in such a case, being conditioned upon secur-
ing for the principal a binding contract and recovery of 
a commission being precluded where the broker does not 
produce a party who enters into such a contract and fur-
nishes guaranteed notes satisfactory to the principal, pur-
suant to previous tentative arrangements agreed upon, but 
rather fails to meet the conditions, where there is no waiver 
of performance, even though the principal, acting upon 
the verbal representations of the customer, in anticipation 
that the contract will be consummated, incurs expense in 
preparation for performance of the contract. J. P. C. 
Petroleum Corp. v. Vulcan Steel Tank Corp. (1941, CA 
lOth Okla) 118 F 2d 713. 
8 Am. Jur. page 1084-1085. Sec. 168: To entitle 
a broker to his commissions, he must accomplish what he 
undertook to do in his contract of employment, for, as a 
rule, nothing short of that is sufficient to constitute a per-
formance upon his part. He is never entitled to com-
pensation for unsuccessful efforts. In every case reference 
must be had to the terms of that particular employment in 
order to determine whether or not a broker's duties have 
been performed .... 
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Page 1089. Sec. 173 .... According to still other 
decisions the necessity of having the contract negotiated 
reduced to writing depends upon the ultimate result of 
the transaction. That is, the broker, at his own risk, has 
the option of either securing a binding written contract 
from his customer or of producing a person who is not 
only then, but at all times thereafter, ready, able, and 
willing to carry out the deal in hand. 
Page 1092. Sec. 176 .... In other words, if the prin-
cipal does not see fit to modify his original proposals the 
broker can lay no claim to his commissions until he pro-
duces a person who is ready, able, and willing to accept 
the exact terms of his principal. This is true even though 
there is but a slight variance between the contract ten-
dered by the broker and that authorized by his employer. 
Thus if the person produced by a broker is willing to pur-
chase at the price set by the employer of the latter but 
is not willing to pay such price in the exact manner pre-
scribed in the broker's contract of employment the latter 
is not entitled to his commissions. 
Where, in response to an inquiry by real estate dealer, 
owner of reality wrote a letter stating that he would sell 
realty for a price stated, ccterms, cash or contract," dealer 
had authority to sell realty by contract only upon terms 
to be agreed upon and which were satisfactory and accept-
able to owner, and dealer was not entitled to a commission 
for finding a buyer on contract under terms not accept-
able to or confirmed by owner.-White v. Turner, 192 
P. 2d 200, 164 Kan. 659. 
Broker who merely secures contract obligating pur-
chaser to consummate purchase or forfeit earnest money 
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or partial payments is not entitled to commission. Scott 
v. Kennedy, 3 P. 2d 907, 152 Okl. 165. 
Point II. 
Exhibit rr 1" was not subscribed by either of the parties 
to the said proposed sale and is, therefore, void under the 
statute of frauds. 
Defendant, in its point II, alleges that the details of 
the agreement between the plaintiffs and the buyers cchad 
all been arranged and agreed upon" as evidenced by Ex-
hibit ul." We have pointed out hereinbefore that the in-
disputable evidence is that Exhibit cc1" was merely a pre-
liminary memorandum of what the parties were discussing 
and that both of the said parties had notified Mr. Eggert-
sen, upon leaving his office, that nothing more should be 
done by way of drawing an agreement until they notified 
him. Furthermore, Exhibit cc 1" was not subscribed by 
anybody and it is, therefore, wholly invalid for any pur-
pose under Section 2 5-5-1 Utah Code Ann. 19 53 (and 
33-5-1 Utah Code Ann. 1943). 
The case of LeVine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 
P. 2, Ann. Cases 1912, C 407, holds that the signature of 
the vendor only is sufficient under this statute. In the 
instant case not even the vendor signed the memorandum, 
and the undisputed evidence is that it was never intended 
as anything more than some notes made by Mr. Eggertsen 
of a preliminary discussion of terms. It is elementary that 
a deficiency in a memorandum cannot be supplied by 
parole evidence. ( 49 Am. Juris. 63 6) 
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Point III. 
The defendant failed to produce purchasers who were 
read,y, willing and able at any time to purchase the said 
property under any terms or conditions agreeable to the 
plaintiffs. 
Defendant relies in part upon the general allegation 
that the pur.chasers were ready, willing and able to fulfill 
their agreement, and that plaintiffs refused to go through 
with the agreement. 
We again emphasize the fact that the earnest money 
receipt and agreement, Exhibit uA," contained absolute-
ly no provisions as to the time or manner of the payment 
of the $19,000.00 balance, and that that element of the 
proposed agreement, undetermined as it was, was suffi-
ciently vital and important to render the entire agreement 
void and unenforceable for lack of certainty and definite-
ness. Admittedly the parties to the proposed sale did 
discuss the said terms, and the proposed buyers did suggest 
the transfer of their interest in some property as security 
for the payment of said balance, but the record is devoid 
of any evidence that the plaintiffs ever accepted such pro-
posal, and in fact the said proposals were rejected as 
evidenced by the Notice, Exhibit ccz." Under the terms 
of Exhibit uA" it could not be said that the plaintiffs were 
obligated to accept any particular part of the $19,000.00 
at any certain time nor that they would be obligated to 
accept any particular security for the payment of the said 
$19,000.00, nor even that they would be obligated to ac-
cept the said $19,000.00 in cash, if such a tender had been 
made by the buyers. Furthermore, the buyers at no time 
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did any more than to offer to pay the $6,000.00, required 
to be paid within 60 days, and to discuss or confer con-
cerning the payment of the balance. At no time did the 
said pur.chasers tender payment of the full balance of 
$19,000.00 in cash. How can it be said that the proposed 
purchasers were ready, willing and able to perform when 
there is no determination as to what would constitute 
performance? 
The cases hereinbefore cited under Point I apply with 
equal effect to Point III. We further refer to 12 A.L.R. 
2d at page 1421 and pages following for additional anno-
tations on the points herein mentioned. 
It is elementary, of course, that a real estate broker 
is not entitled to a commission for procuring a purchaser 
or lessee on terms different than those agreeable or accept-
able to the owner. (E. B. Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 103 Utah 
554, 137 Pac. 2d 342; White v. Turner, 164 Kan. 659, 
192 Pac. 2d 200). 
Defendant further contends that failure to consum-
mate the said sale was due to some failure or refusal on 
the part of the plaintiffs. We again submit that there is 
no evidence in the record of such failure or refusal. It is 
clear that unless the failure to secure a purchaser upon the 
terms proposed and within the time provided is due to 
the negligence, fraud or fault of the owner, a real estate 
broker may not recover upon his contract for commisions 
(Ford v. Palisades Corp. 101 C.A. 2d 491, 225 Pac. 2d 
545). 
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Point IV. 
The plaintiffs at no time accepted the said purchaser, 
and there was never any meeting of minds between the said 
purchasers and the plaintiffs as to the terms or conditions 
of the payment of the purchase price of the said property. 
Defendant contends in his Point III that the fact that 
the plaintiffs and the proposed purchasers negotiated in 
an attempt to consummate the sale which the defendant 
commenced to make proves that the proposed purchaser 
was accepted by the plaintiffs. 
We again emphasize that the only thing the defendant 
did was to obtain Mr. and Mrs. Johnson as prospective 
buyers who made a down payment of $1 ,000.00, agreed 
to pay $6,000.00 in 60 days and the balance of $19,000.00 
in some manner yet to be determined. Surely the fact 
that plaintiffs attempted to cooperate in the completion 
of the job that the defendant had commenced should not 
result in penalizing the plaintiffs to the extent of relieving 
the defendants of any further responsibility. The un-
disputed evidence is that the defendant did nothing further 
to consummate the transaction after obtaining Exhibit 
HA" other than to make some contacts in an effort to ob-
tain the bond for the purchasers. We submit that the 
defendant was not entitled to wash its hands of all re-
sponsibility of completing the proposed sale simply because 
plaintiffs and the proposed purchasers expended some ef-
forts of their own to assist in completing the sale. 
We challenge the defendant to point to any evidence 
in the record which shows that the plaintiffs and Mr. and 
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Mrs. Johnson ever agreed upon how or when the $19,-
000.00 would be paid. The citations and references here-
inbefore set forth in Point I apply as well to the facts 
referred to in Point IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the defendant 
utterly failed to obtain a buyer who was ready, willing 
and able to purchase the property on terms acceptable to 
the seller; that unacceptable terms could not be imposed 
upon the plaintiffs so as to entitle the defendant to a com-
mission; that the defendant wholly failed to earn any 
commission in the transaction, and that it would be un-
conscionable to permit the defendant to retain the 
$1,000.00 paid to it in this transaction; and that the plain-
tiffs are entitled to judgment as awarded by the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY & NELSON 
Attorneys far Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
212 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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